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The Socialist Legacy of Jean Jaur2s 
and Ikon Blum 
Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr. 
The tradition of socialist theory and practice associated with the 
Frenchmen Jean Jau* and L b n  Blum is virtually unheard of in the 
Philippines. In a way, this is not surprising in a polity where ideo- 
logical distinctions are not fully understood and appreciated, and 
where "socialism" is often equated with the "communism" espoused 
by the underground Communist Party of the Philippines and its 
allies. But such a gap in knowledge, while understandable, is most 
unfortunate. 
The aim of this note is to help fill this intellectual void in Phil- 
ippine political-economic literature. The note also intends to show 
that this particular French contribution to socialist thinking can bc 
used as a prism through which the current dilemmas facing the 
Phlippine political economy may be discerned-particularly by those 
who have a deep commitment to both political democracy and socio- 
ecor~omic justice. 
We should, of course, guard against any facile comparisons be- 
tween the French and Philippine experiences. Certainly, there is no 
comparing February 1986 in the Philippines with the French Revo- 
lution of 1789, nor can we simply compare the Philippine Demo- 
cratic Sociali,st movement with its counterpart in France. At the same 
time, however, if we were to study carefully the complex political 
position of those whose twin commihncnts to democracy and social- 
ism have led them to defend the Aquino regime against extremist 
challenges--despite this government's obvious limitations and fail- 
ures-perhaps a comparison with the dilemmas of French Socialism 
may not be as pointless as it may seem initially. 
A thoroughly revised and updated version of a lecture originally delivered on 
"Aspects of the French Development Experience" as part of the French Studies Lec- 
tur; Series, "France and the Philippines; Partners in ~Dcvelopment," on 7 Dccember 
1987, Ateneo de Manila University. 
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The contemporary political project of both "defending" the genu- 
ine "democratic gains" of the popular victory against the Marcos dic- 
tatorship and at the same time of "transforming" the very limited 
and formal nature of democracy restored under the Aquino regime, 
finds a parallel in the French experience. The desire "to complete an 
unfinished revolution"-to extend democracy from the political to 
the socioeconomic sphere-is at the heart of the theory and practice 
of that strand of French Socialism identified with JaurGs and Blum. 
It is an important element in the heritage of international Democratic 
Socialism which no serious student of political economy can afford 
to ignore. 
The French Revolution and Its Legacy 
I t  has been said that no individual French socialist thinker has 
exercised as much influence as the British Owen, the Germans Marx 
and Engels, the Russian Lenin, or even the Chinese Mao. But col- 
lectively, the French have had the most influence (Cole 1954-55). 
Any discussion of the French socialist legacy and even of social- 
ism in general, cannot but take as its starting point, the great French 
Revolution of 1789. I t  was the political expression of the Enlightcn- 
ment, the assertion of the democratic ideal, the belief in the "sover- 
eignty of the people." I t  was a revolution against traditionalism and 
absolutism embodied in the French monarchy-the ancien rigime. 
Socialism, to the extent that i t  sees itself as a revolutionary move- 
ment, owes its heritage to the French Revolution. 
Even though the French revolution was founded basically on lib- 
eralism, it also became the catalyst for the emergence of socialism. 
C.D.H. Cole in his history of socialist thought, has argued that while 
the philosophy behind the French Revolution may have stressed 
individualism, at the same time because of it, 
. . . the "social question" forced its way for the first time to the front, 
not merely as a moral problem for a limited group of intellectuals and 
reformers of manners, but as an insistent practical issue involving a 
real and menacing conflict between the rich and the poor, between the 
propertied and propertyless, between the privileged orders of the old 
society and the underprivileged (Cole 1954-55, 12). 
The very limitations of that revolution paved the way for social- 
ist ideas. The continuing poverty of urban workers, in particular, 
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showed the conflict between the political and social implications of 
revolutionary principles. It led to an insistence, as early as 1796 in 
the "conspiracy of equals" led by Gracchus Babeuf, on a "further 
social revolution" in the form of common ownership of the means 
of production (Thomson 1964, 19). This theme was to become cen- 
tral in the writings of the early French socialists: Saint-Simon, 
Fourier, Blanc and Proudhon. Their works all demonstrate a disil- 
lusionment with continuing poverty and inequality in the face of 
political "freedom" and "liberty." 
Another legacy of the French Revolution and its aftermath was 
a consciousness of 'The Republic" as an institution to be defended 
against monarchists, Bonapartists, clericalists, anarchists, faxist-mili- 
tarists and other forces who might wish to destroy it. One must 
recall that the chaos which followed the French Revolution gave way 
eventually to the despotism of Napoleon Bonaparte and to the res- 
toration of the monarchy. Later on, even the Second Republic col- 
lapsed in favor of another Bonaparte. In the 19305, the Third Repub 
lic was threatened by a military coup d'etat and the rise of inter- 
national fascism. The surrender of this same Republic to Germany 
during World War I1 led to the Vichy government's collaboration 
with Hitler. The Fourth Republic, in turn, was marked by continu- 
ing instability and imminent collapse in the postwar years. 
Liberal democracy in France has had a history of coming under 
threat from various anti-republican forces. I t  is therefore seen by 
French democrats as a precious heritage, a treasure that must be 
protected. Thus, many French socialists saw it as their duty to de- 
fend the Republic and the formal institutions of "liberty" which it 
represented. Republican democracy would be the framework from 
which socialism in France was to be constructed. 
The traditional political notions of "Left" and "Right" in France 
were defined originally with reference to the Republic (i.e., "Left" 
signifying pro-republicanism and "Right" signifying anti-republican- 
ism). In the past, both ardent defenders of liberal capitalism as well 
as committed advocates of socialism could be classified as part of 
the French "Left." Thus, French Socialism, to the extent that it is a 
legacy of the French Revolution also has at its core a republican 
heritage. These twin legacies have become a source of both dyna- 
mism and tension in the socialism of Jaures and Blum. 
There are other important traditions of socialism in France. There 
is the anarcho-syndicalist tradition, which has emerged from early 
French socialism and which has permeated the labor movement 
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since then. This tradition has historically been suspicious, if not 
hostile, to the state and to political action, particularly, parliamen- 
tary activity. Instead, it has advocated the direct action of the work- 
ers through the ultimate weapon of the general strike. 
Even before 1914, there was a distinct strand of French socialism 
identified with the French Marxist Jules Guesde and guided by 
orthodox historical and dialectical materialism. And after the Rus- 
sian Revolution of 1917 and the 1920 Congress of Tours, the machin- 
ery of the unified French Socialist Party was taken over by its left 
wing to form the French Communist Party along Marxist-Leninist 
lines and aligned with the Third International. 
But as stated earlier, this note shall concern itself only with that 
strand of French socialism which, while critical of the limitations of 
the French Revolution especially in the socio-economic realm, was 
also concerned with preserving the liberal and humanistic achicve- 
ments of that "bourgeois revolution" in the political and cultural 
realm. 
Jaures: Socialism as the Completion of Democracy 
Jean Jaures (1859-1914) was the acknowledged leader of the 
French Socialists from the time of their unification in 1905 under one 
party-the Section Fran~aise de l'lnternationale Ouvn'ere (S.F.I.O&un- 
ti1 his assassination in 1914. He was "the outstanding figure in the 
French Socialist Party, and also the greatest single figure in the 
Congresses of the Second International" (Cole 1953, 373). He was.a 
professor of philosophy, a gifted orator, a prolific journalist and a 
master politician responsible for bringing together the various fac- 
tions of French Socialists under one party. For Jaures, the mission 
of socialism was to continue the work of the French Revolution of 
1789-to complete rather than destroy its achievements: 
The triumph of socialism will not be a break with the French Revo- 
lution but the fulfillment of the French Revolution in new economic 
conditions. uaurhs in Przeworski 1980, 31) 
The French Republic which was an achievement of the revolution 
was, thercfore, not an enemy but an instrument of socialism. Democ- 
racy was not in its essence a bourgeois institution. For JaurGs, d c  
mocracy was: 
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. . . the largest and most solid terrain on which the working class can 
stand . . . the bedrock that the reactionary bourgeoisie cannot dissolve 
without opening fissures in the earth and throwing itself unto them. 
Uaurb in Przeworski 1980, 33) 
Socialism was necessarily to be built on democratic foundations. 
Socialism was the completion of democracy, not its destruction and 
replacement by an alternative class dictatorship. 
The socialism which Jaur&s represented was deeply humanistic 
and democratic. He continually stressed the moral and ethical bases 
of socialism. His lifelong philosophy was thus an attempted synthe- 
sis of materialism and idealism (see Jaures 1895 in Fried and Sand- 
ers 1964). "His passion for the free life enriched the socialist tradi- 
tion, endowed it with a deep human value" (Goldberg 1968, 136). 
Though conscious of the inevitable tension between authority and 
freedom under socialism, Jaures believed that this dilemma could 
and should be resolved, because socialism without freedom would 
bc devoid of true meaning. 
We socialists, we also have a free spirit; we also feel restive under 
external restraint . . . If we couldn't walk and sing and meditate under 
the sky, if we couldn't drink in the air and pick flowers when we 
chose, we would even accept the present society, despite its misery 
and incoherence; for though its freedom is a deception, it is a dcccp- 
tion which men still agree to call a truth and which sometimes grips 
their hearts . . .  ath her-solitude with all its perils than coercion, rather 
anarchy than despotism, whatever its disguise. (Jauri?~ in Goldberg 
1%8, 136) 
Jaurcs saw socialism as a revolutionary project. But since it was 
rooted in republicanism, socialism was a revolution that was "well 
on its way." It was not necessary to make a new revolution. Jaur+s' 
revolutionism was "fully consistent with reformism and quite incon- 
sistent with any doctrine of destructive violence . . ." (Cole 1953, 
375). Reform and revolution were thus not mutually exclusive in his 
worldview. In a famous statement during the S.F.I.O. Congress at 
Toulouse in 1908, Jaures declared: 
Precisely because we are a party of revolution, we are the most deeply 
reformist party, the only one which can give response to the demands 
of the workeis, and make each conquest a point of departure for fur- 
ther conquests. (Jaurb in Goldberg 1968, 551) 
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Jaures, however, did not fully embrace the ideas of the German 
"revisionist" theoretician Eduard Bernstein, nor did he completely 
approve of the actions of the French socialist parliamentarian Alex- 
andre Millerand. He believed that Bernstein's fundamental rejection 
of the central tenets of Marxism transformed socialism into "a re- 
formism without identity and substance." On the other hand, the 
parliamentary tactics of Millerand and the "Independent So- 
cialists" had "scrapped Marxism for a vague pragmatism." Though 
Jaures "deeply believed in amelioration through reforms, he was 
equally convinced that no social system short of collectivist social- 
ism could permanently provide full employment and fair distribu- 
tion" (Jaures in Goldberg 1968, 26869). While he was prepared to 
accept reforms, he was not willing to accept them on terms which 
would lead to the "domestication" of the workers' movement 
and to the destruction of their power (Cole 1953, 375). G.D.H. Cole's 
very perceptive insight into Jaurcs' politics deserves lengthy quota- 
tion here: 
By disposition he was a parliamentarian, and he was by no means 
prepared to regard the state as simply the cxccutivc committee of thc 
ruling class. Yet this did not mean that he belonged to the constitu- 
tionalist right wing: he insisted that the workers, in their struggle for 
power, could not allow themselves to be shut up  within the confines 
of bourgeois legality. They might, he agreed, have to act unconstitu- 
tionally, to flout the law, or to rise in rebellion; but he regarded such 
a p r o s p ~ ~ t ,  not with the jubilation of the instinctive revolutionary, but 
. . 
as an unpleasant necessity to be avoided as  far as possible, because 
he was very anxious that the growing pains of the new society should 
not destroy the human and cultural values that were worthy of being 
taken over into it. (Cole 1933, 379) 
Blum: Socialist "Exercise of Power" 
Leon Blum (1872-1950) was in many respects the successor of 
Jaures, both in mind and spirit. But in one sense, Blum surpassed 
his mentor by forming the first Socialist-led Popular Front govem- 
ment in France in 1936. Blum was the leader of the French Social- 
ists from 1920 until the years immediately following the Second 
World War. But the party he led was no longer the same S.F.I.0 that 
Jauri?s had so carefully and painstakingly put together. The Russian 
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 had led to the setting up of the Third 
International which forced a split in the S.F.I.O. in their 1920 Con- 
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gress at Tours. The new Moscow-based International secured the 
adherence of the left wing majority of the French Socialists based on 
the "21 points" imposed by Lenin and Zinoviev for admission. The 
minority Center and Right factions refused to accept the conditions 
unconditionally, left the Congress and launched a new Socialist Party 
but used the prewar party's old name and statutes. 
Blum was particularly opposed to the principles of the Third 
International and in a speech before the Congress of Tours de- 
nounced Bolshevism as a narrow creed specific to the Russian ex- 
perience and inconsistent with European socialist traditions. Blum 
noted that Communism, among its many errors, wrongly equated 
the seizure of power with social revolution, perverted the democratic 
process with its concept of party organization, threatened the tradi- 
tional independence of trade unions which it sought to put under 
party control, and denied that workers could fight to defend their 
nation (Greene 1969, 2). 
Like Jaurh, Blum's socialism represented a synthesis of the French 
democratic tradition with selected aspects of Manism. The product 
was a socialism propelled by a moral impulse-a socialism in a 
humanist mould. He also believed that political and social democ- 
racy were inseparable. The goal of socialism was to realize "the great 
ideals of 1789 . . . and infuse the economic and social order with 
political, civil and personal liberty" (Blum in Greene 1969, 14). 
Consistent with the social democratic tradition, Blum did not 
dichotomize reform and revolution. Reforms contained the seeds of 
revolution. He did not equate socialism with gradual capitalist r e  
form, however. To achieve socialism, the conquest of power by the 
working classes was necessary. "I do not recognize two kinds of 
socialism, revolutionary and nonrevolutionary. There is only one 
socialism, and it is . . . inherently r e v o l u t i o n a ~  (Blum in Halperin 
1946, 250). 
Nevertheless, Blum argued that without "revolutionary prepara- 
tion," a premature seizure of power (as advocated by the Commu- 
nists) could only lead to tyranny and repression. This long process 
of preparation for social revolution could be attained only through 
participation in the institutions of the Republic (Greene 1969, 15). 
Thus, following Jau+s, Blum strove to integrate the French Social- 
ist Party into the country's parliamentary system. Like his revered 
master, he saw that the defense of democracy was consistent with 
the struggle for socialism. It was in this light that he developed his 
theory of the "exercise of power." 
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As an added background, it must be pointed out that the 1904 
Congress of the Second International at Amsterdam explicitly for- 
bade socialist participation in bourgeois governments as a general 
rule. This resolution was made as a direct response to a crisis in 
French Socialism triggered by Millerand's acceptance of a Cabinet 
post in the liberal regime of RenC Waldeck-Rousseau. While critically 
supportive of Millerand's actions as crucial for Republican defense, 
Jaures had accepted the Amsterdam resolution as a necessary con- 
dition for socialist unification. In the 1920s, the S.F.I.O. continued to 
adhere to this principle, partly to demonstrate their revolutionary 
commitment in the face of the mounting challenges coming from the 
French Communist Party. 
During the latter half of the 1920s, however, there was increas- 
ing pressure on the Socialists to accept positions in the Cabinet, since 
they had become the second leading party in the country next to the 
Radical Socialists. I t  was in this context that Blum made a distinc- 
tion between the "conquest of power," which was a revolutionary 
notion designed to bring about socialist transformation, and the 
"exercise of power" in a capitalist regime, which was nonrevolution- 
ary and merely the "consequence of parliamentary action itself." As 
he noted in a speech in 1926: 
If through thc operation of parliamentary institutions, we were callcd 
upon to exercise powcr within the framework of c x i s ~ ~ n g  institutions 
and of the present constitution, wc would exercise it legally and loy- 
ally without committing any chicanery like attempting to profit by our 
prcsencc inside the government in order to transform the exercise of 
power into a conquest of power. (Blum in Colton 1953, 522) 
Blum was aware of the inherent risks and contradictions of a 
Socialist "exercise of powcr" which he foresaw as "a particularly 
painful and difficult experience:'--"an experience to which the party 
can be subjected even inspite of itself" (Blum in Colton 1953, 523). 
This was true, not only in a situation where the Socialist Party 
would find itself as a minority partner in a "bourgeois" Cabinet, but 
also even in the case of a "balanced" governmental coalition with 
nonsocialists. Much later in his career, he wrote: 
Perhaps there is no more arduous task in the world than that of a 
Socialist government acting within the framework of the capitalist 
system, which it has neither the power nor the mandate to transform 
in its legal essence. I t  embodies at the same time the working class 
and the statc. (Blum in Colton 1933, 540) 
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Blum believed, however, that such an involvement in government, 
while exceptional, was justified when the Republic itself was threat- 
ened by counter-revolution, which during Blum's time was epito- 
mized by fascism. It was precisely this right-wing threat which 
opened the possibility for a Cabinet role for the Socialists as early 
as 1932 and paved the way for the creation of the Popular Front 
government in 1936 which Blum headed in coalition with the Radi- 
cal Socialists. Even after the defeat of Blum's government, it was this 
same belief in the socialist responsibility to defend the democratic 
Republic-in the "vital connection between the preservation of poli- 
tical democracy and the advance of socialism" (Blum in Colton 1953, 
533)-which led to Socialist participation in other nonsocialist gov- 
ernments in the years preceding and following the Second World War. 
The Dilemmas of Democratic Socialism 
What were the political implications of the socialism of Jaurb and 
Blum? The discussion above shows that central to their conception 
of socialism was their republicanism. Both of them were of the firm 
belief that a genuine socialist commitment required full participation 
in the life of the (bourgeois) Republic which also meant its active 
defense during times of crisis. 
Thus, for example, during the Dreyfus Affair of the late nine- 
teenth century when French society was polarized into two camps- 
the anti-Dreyfusard monarchists and militarists on one side, and the 
Dreyfusard liberal republicans on the other-Jaures supported the 
entry of the then socialist Millerand into a Radical Cabinet. Jaures 
was also instrumental in the creation and maintenance of an active 
alliance among the bourgeois and socialist "Left"4espite this bloc's 
nonsocialist objectives. Jaures subsumed socialist goals under the 
banner of "Republican defense." 
While such a perspective and approach was responsible for the 
growth of French Socialism as a parliamentary force and rooted its 
politics and ideology firmly in the democratic tradition, Jaures' 
"political Radicalism" was also a major cause of instability within 
the Socialist Party. It "encouraged Frenchmen of the left to swing 
to and fro between Socialism and Radicalism, or at all events be- 
tween Socialist self-sufficiency and alliance with the bourgeois left" 
(Cole 1958, 496). As Jaurh himself was to discover painfully in the 
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case of his former colleagues and friends in the "Independent So- 
cialist" tendency (e.g., Millerand, Aristide Briand and Rene Viviani), 
the lines between Republicanism and Socialism could become 
blurred beyond recognition. Reforms, and worse, the pursuit of high- 
ranking government positions, could become the ends, not the 
means, of some self-proclaimed "socialists" (see Goldberg 1968). 
Similarly, in the case of Blum, it was the fascist threat of the 
1930s and the double threat of Gaullism and Communism in the 
1940s, which justified socialist participation in "defensive" govem- 
ment coalitions which were hardly committed to socialist transfor- 
mation. Because the country's democratic liberties were being threat- 
ened, "the Socialist party had to subordinate everything to the over- 
riding duty of defending those liberties" (Blum in Colton 1953, 536). 
For Blum, what had happened was not simply the subordination of 
Socialist loyalties to Republican loyalties. He was convinced until 
the end of his life that thc socialist program "rested first and fore- 
most upon the safety of the democratic republic" (Blum in Colton 
1953, 542). 
This complete identification of the Socialist Party with liberal 
democratic reformism and sometimes, even with conscrvativc poli- 
cies, led to widespread disillusionment among its former support- 
ers, which was manifested in elections throughout the 1950s and 
1960s. Jean Rous, a Socialist deputy in parliament who resigned from 
the party in 1947, revealed the extent of disillusionment when he 
attacked the S.F.I.O. for acquiescing to "pro-capitalist, pro-imperialist 
and anti-labor" policies in the name of defending the Republic. 
By carrying out the policy of 'others' . . . the S.F.I.O. has now become 
a party of 'others,' a party that still has perhaps a rolc of republican 
center to play, the heritage of the old Radical party to pick up and 
exploit, but a rolc that has nothing in common with that of a work- 
ers' party. (Rous in Colton 1933, 539) 
I t  is a sad fact, indeed, that the mainstream of French Socialism, 
in common with the other parties of the Second International, had 
in due course abandoned their maximum goal of "socialization" in 
favor of "republican dcfcnse" and "welfare promotion." To be sure, 
many social reforms were real working class gains-as was true of 
the reforms achieved during Blum's Popular Front government. But 
what became a significant deviation from thc tradition of Jaurk and 
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perhaps even of Blum, was that the reforms were no longer seen in 
the context of an eventual transition to "full socialism." The logic of 
electoralism and parliamentary participation had a natural moderat- 
ing influence (see Przeworski 1980 and 1985). The dramatic rise to 
power of Francois Mitterand's Parti Socialiste (formed in 1968) 
marked a new turn in the history of French Socialism and deserves 
separate discussion elsewhere. What is apparent, however, is that the 
current socialist vocabulary of "technocratic modernism'' and "supe- 
rior economic management" seems even more removed from the 
Jaurcs-Blum conception of socialism and of the role of the Socialist 
Party than the welfare state ideology of post-World War I1 social dem- 
ocracy (see Ross and Jenson 1988; Kesselrnan 1986; and Petras 1984). 
The defense of democracy has not led to its completion. The revo- 
lution has remained unfinished. 
The Aquino Regime and Philippine Democratic Socialism 
Much space has been devoted towards an understanding of the 
socialism of Jean Jaures and Lkon Blum because the French experi- 
ence finds a striking parallel in the contemporary Philippine situ- 
ation-in the theory and practice of the so-called "Democratic So- 
cialist" tendency. While an extended discussion of the nature and 
history of this political grouping and of the even broader "Demo- 
cratic Left" in the Philippines is beyond the scope of this note, i t  is 
possible to gain some insights into this distinct ideological tendency 
by appreciating the complex political stance taken by its adherents 
towards the 1986 EDSA revolution and the formally liberal demo- 
cratic system restored under the Aquino government.' 
One must remember that the "Democratic Left" participated in the 
1986 elections in support of Cory Aquino, in marked contrast with 
the national democrats. "Participation without illusions" meant 
making common cause with Center-Right groups and individuals 
(including Aquino herself) who while anti-Marcos and anti-dictator- 
ship, did not share the commitment to far reaching political and 
social reform. But the creation of a broad centrist democratic alliance 
was seen as a necessary condition for bringing abouf a more socially 
just order through relatively peaceful means. 
Thus when victory came in February 1986, the response of this 
tendency was not, as in the case of the mainstream national demo- 
crats, to dismiss it outright as meaningless, but to describe the EDSA 
uprising as an "unfinished revolution." What this position meant 
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was that its supporters considered the ouster of the Marcos dicta- 
torship as  a genuine gain for political democracy. But they also b e  
lieved that the real meaning of "people power" lay in authentic 
popular empowerment through independent mass organizations and 
social transformation via redistributive government programs. The 
democratic struggle was seen as a continuing process. 
Such a position has meant the active defense of the so-called 
"democratic space" which also implied critical support for a gener- 
ally conservative Aquino government, since it was the only legiti- 
mate and concrete vehicle of the democratic transition. Thus the 
various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), sectoral organiza- 
tions and political groups associated with the "Democratic Left" lent 
their full support to the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the 
consolidation of liberal democratic representative institutions and the 
continued defenx of the constitutional order against violent threats 
from both the extreme Right and Left. Much in the spirit of Jaurcs 
and Blum, they believe that the deepening of democracy presup- 
poses its strength. 
The evolution of the Aquino regime, however, away from any 
bold initiatives for both political and social reform towards policies 
catering to established political and business interests, has resulted 
in much dissatisfaction with the government among many segments 
of the "Democratic Left." Moreover, this has led ti i general suspi- 
cion of and distaste for the Aquino government's offers of collabo- 
ration (as illustrated by the NGOs' lukewarm response to Kabi~ig).~ 
But here lies precisely the dilemma for Democratic Socialists. The 
paralysis and conservatism of the Aquino government in the face of 
crisis has fueled the insurrectionist ambitions of political extremists. 
But even more worrisome is the fact that even within mainstream 
political and business circles, there are people who are attracted to 
an authoritarian solution to the problems of the country. The weak- 
ness of the Aquino governmcnt has been interpreted as the weak- 
ness of democratic governance itself. There are those who seem to 
be willing to discard the gains of the popular victory against dicta- 
torship in the name of political stability, economic growth and na- 
tional security. 
Conclusion 
The survival of democratic institutions continues to be at stake in 
the current period of politicoeconomic transition in the Philippines. 
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Thus, a significant number of Filipino progressives, consistent with 
their conception of socialism as anchored in a continuing process of 
democratization, accept that the preservation of liberal democratic 
institutions is an essential component of their socialist commitment. 
It appears from the experience of France, however, that the chal- 
lenge of such a commitment lies in translating "defensive" action 
into an "offensive" project which does not surrender the interests of 
workers and other oppressed sectors to the prerogatives of conser- 
vative democrats, but instead advances socialist influence in the 
formal power structures of society. 
Surely, socialist politics in the tradition of Jaures and Blum is 
fraught with many tensions and even contradictions. Success de- 
mands much hard-nosed organizing and political creativity which 
combines both exh-a-parliamentary and parliamentary activity. Fili- 
pino Democratic Socialists have recognized that the challenge in 1992 
and beyond lies in being able to penetrate effectively into the Phil- 
ippine political mainstream, which obviously means electoral and 
governmental participation3 But perhaps the greater and more dif- 
ficult challenge is to accomplish this objective without abandoning 
the more fundamental and long-term structural goals. 
Despite accusations of "utopianism" and "eclecticism" from both 
political conservatives and radicals, the commitment to both democ- 
racy and socialism in the Philippines remains a compelling vision. 
That vision defines today's task for Filipino Democratic Socialists to 
complete the unfinished revolution. 
Notes 
1. Democratic Socialism in the Philippines dates back to the Christian Socialism 
of Raul Manglapus and the "moderate" activism of the pre-1972 era. But the codifi- 
cation of Philippine Democratic Socialist theory and practice owes much to the pains  
taking work of Jesuit socialist theoretiam, Romeo J. Intengan, during the martial law 
period. "Democratic Left" is also understood in the broader sense of all the various 
groups and individuals who are critical of the dogmatic and centralist tendencies of 
the National Democratic Left. For discussions of this tendency, see Karaos (1987); 
Abinales (1986); Tadem (1986); and Tolosa (1990). 
2. The brief and difficult experience of Florencio "Butch" Abad-a mu&-respected 
"Demomatic Left" personality-as a member of the Aquino Cabinet, contributed much 
to the NGOs' disillusionment with Cory Aquino. For an insider's view of this "DAK 
experience," see Tolosa (1992). 
3. Social development NGOs identified with the "Democratic Left" have, in fact, 
initiated "Projmt 2001"-a collective undertaking with the aim of making massbascd 
pcople's organizations a significant electoral force in the twenty-first century. It in- 
volves strategic and creative participation in electoral cxerciscs bcginnin): In 1992. 
LEGACY OF JAURES AND BLUM 
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